Article

Blink or Wink: The Indiscernibility of Willed Actions

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Abstract

This paper explores the problem of indiscernibility between causally determined and non-causally determined actions, using the example of blinking and winking. It is argued that if at least one action can be either causally determined or willed, it may be impossible to reliably distinguish between the two classes of the act. A hypothetical experiment is proposed in which observers attempt to differentiate between willed and involuntary blinks in others. The paper suggests that even if subjective knowledge of willed actions exists, there may be no way to objectively distinguish them, leading to a state of incomplete objective knowledge intermingled with subjective complete knowledge. The implications of this indiscernibility are discussed in relation to the existence and influence of the will, suggesting that the will may exist and exert influence without being something about which we could have objective knowledge. It is further posited that the dependence of one thing on another does not necessitate a causal relationship, opening avenues for further exploration of free will and determinism.

Keywords: Will, volition, causal determination, free will, determinisms, blinking, winking, objective knowledge, subjective knowledge, agency.

Introduction and Background

The philosophical investigation into the nature of the will necessitates a thorough examination of its lexicogrammatical dimensions, exploring how language shapes and reflects our understanding of this elusive concept (Ekstrom, 2010). A theory of the will must address several key aspects, including the will's intrinsic nature, its internal composition, and its external relationships (Donahue, 2007). The will is related to the conscious choices and actions within the world (Lombard, 2017). Our conscious experience of the world is framed by language that affects how we experience the will. It is imperative to explore the concept of "will" through the lenses of supervenience and haecceitism, philosophical frameworks that offer distinct perspectives on the relationship between properties and individuals, as well as providing valuable insights into the nature of the will and its place in the broader landscape of existence. Supervenience, in its essence, posits that certain properties are dependent on or determined by other properties; specifically, a property A is said to supervene on property B if any change in A necessitates a change in B (Newman, 2007). To further understand supervenience, we can construe

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determinism as a thesis that everything in the future supervenes the present and potentially the past (Fan, 2019).

Haecceitism, on the other hand, introduces the concept of "haecceities," which are the individual essences or "thisness" of objects or individuals. Volition and will are present in psychoanalysis as well (Meissner, 2009).

Furthermore, the will is manifested in the self-regulation of activity in implementation of decisions, thus becoming an element of the personality structure (Шелехов et al., 2020). The will is an understudied topic, but in its definition, it is the conscious purposive management of a person's mental processes (Шелехов et al., 2020). Contemporary views have looked unfavorably on the concept of volition, but in order to understand the will, volition can be viewed as the executive mental process mediating the deliberation, decision, and voluntary bodily action of an agent (Zhu, 2004).

The study of will has deep roots in philosophy, tracing back to thinkers like Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Nietzsche, both of whom grappled with its role in human action and morality (Naze, 2021). It is imperative to delve into the lexicogrammatical landscape surrounding the will, scrutinizing its various linguistic expressions and grammatical structures, because a lexicogrammatical study can involve an investigation of words related to “will,” such as “volition,” “choice,” “intention,” “desire,” and their grammatical behaviors, meanings, and contextual usages.

The use of "will" as a future tense auxiliary verb has implications for how we perceive agency and causality (Vogelmann, 2020). Analyzing these linguistic nuances can help reveal the intricate ways in which language shapes our understanding of human agency and moral responsibility (Adli and Abykeeva-Sultanalieva, 2024). Moreover, the exploration of conditional clauses expressing hypothetical scenarios involving the will can shed light on how we reason about possibilities and counterfactuals related to our choices and actions. Examining the implications of will provides insight into ethical implications regarding ideas such as consequentialism and inconsequentialism (Naze, 2021).

Considering the multifaceted nature of the will, the exploration of its lexicogrammatical dimensions becomes crucial for unraveling its complexities and nuances. In order to embrace such considerations, one must have awareness of such ideas as moral responsibility. Individuals must abide by moral laws that occasionally go against free will. By delving into the linguistic expressions and grammatical structures associated with the will, we can gain deeper insights into its philosophical underpinnings, ultimately contributing to a more comprehensive understanding of this fundamental aspect of human existence (Glannon, 2012). The will is related to volitional qualities such as purposefulness and perseverance (Turarova, Mambetalina and Zhumagalieva, 2023).

Lexico-Grammatical Approach to the "Will"

As it pertains to the comprehension of words encountered during any form of communication, one ought to question what is being claimed to be understood and how it came to be such. Thoroughly contemplating the what and the how as legitimate inquiries into the nature of understanding ought to lead one ultimately to the discovery of a set whose elements comprise

binary relations. Unfortunately, despite their import and familiarity, these relations are often taken for granted in the process of understanding. That set comprises, in no particular order, both meaning and interpretation.

Under the assumption that one exists in a state of ignorance concerning a word, concept, or whatever it may be that they admit not to know prior to their gaining an understanding, in the process of learning it either one of two things may occur: 1) they may be confused, or 2) they may come to understand. While the latter would be preferable, in the less desirable and unfortunate case of the former, either the confusion could be said to result from a lack of clarity due to the source, or it could be a misunderstanding on the part of the one trying to learn. Regardless how this confusion may be characterized, from the perspective of the person learning the reality is simply that they ultimately encounter or experience inconsistencies of some sort that are responsible for preventing a gain in understanding.

In order for a gain in understanding to be established, there are two aspects necessarily involved: meaning, and interpretation. Meaning refers to an implicit or explicit significance to an individual while interpretation relates to the manner in which something is perceived by the same individual (OUP, 2015). Additionally, there must exist a natural order for the two aspects involved such that one always precedes the other when an understanding is developing. The natural ordering, therefore, is relevant because when it occurs and is identified, though not necessarily causal, the correlational relationship implies that understanding is in process. It must be emphasized that the natural ordering for the aspects is found only once: during the initial effort to understand. Nevertheless, once successful in gaining an initial understanding any natural, consistent ordering is forever lost.

Whenever understanding occurs for the first time, regardless whether occurring between human beings acting as the learner and the source or between a human learner and inanimate source, because people always are engaged in some form of behavior, one ought to allow for the use of a framework that derives from theories of behavior to be used as a potential method to establish what the natural ordering is.

While there exist various theories in the literature, the one that the author selected because it was straightforward was the theory of human behavior known as symbolic interactionism. Symbolic interactionism (Mead 1932; Blumer 1969) is based on three assumptions:

(1) people act toward things based on the meaning they hold to the particular people acting,

(2) that meaning is derived from social interactions, and

(3) that meaning results from of an interpretive process people utilize to deal with what they encounter in its own context.

All three assumptions comprising the theory are important, but it is assumption (3) that is most relevant, as it explains how interpretation yields meaning. so, when acting toward something, that it is based on meaning to the individual who interprets suggests that implicit in such behavior is the existence of an underlying subjective claim of understanding.

The process of understanding is iterative in that, after an initial interpretation from which meaning is derived, subsequent encounters permit opportunities for further interpretation within various contexts that may result in a different meaning being

attributed. Moreover, how one interprets influences what meaning they derive likely occurs as much as the meaning influences how one interprets; either direction potentially alters one's understanding. Thus, since either meaning or interpretation influence one another, and they both affect understanding, they are referred to as modes of understanding (Carroll, 2018), which directly relates to an understanding of the will.

Understanding the Will

Deriving the meaning of the will through interpretation results in multiple understandings based on its use. Having multiple meanings, the word will itself is by definition Polysemous (Carter, 2012) comprising both grammatical and lexical understanding.

"Will" may be used grammatically, as a part of speech and sentence structure in nounal, adjectival, or verbal capacities (Carter, 2012). Alternatively, the word will may also be employed lexically in which role it can mean or be interpreted in any of several ways.

Interestingly, in addition to being used as a noun or verb, "will" may also reflect when an action occurred, which is referred to as an indication of tense (Merriam-Webster, 2017).

When the word "will" is employed as a tense indicator (Vocabulary, Carter, 2009), it can connote a lack of either initiation or completion of the action of a verb. As an example, the statement "I will go" has the conveyance of "although I have yet to go at the moment of utterance, my going is to subsequently occur." (N.B: conveyance was used in the sense that [will] in this respect is "the action or process of transporting someone or something from one place {i.e., not having gone} to another [i.e., going]).

Although the grammaticality of "will" as used to reflect tense seems to be consistent with the historical context of the notion, it is the following two senses of the word that seem to be somewhat more relevant to our discussion. firstly, the will has been interpreted within many contexts to be an intermediary between both reason and appetite (Encyclopedia of Philosophy, n.d.). Lastly, Aristotle's usage of several words in his writings concerning the motivation that converts thoughts into action and his writing about self-controlled and uncontrolled activities both indirectly contribute to thee discourse on understanding the will. As it so happens, translations of these works by scholars resulted in. such words as "choice," and "purpose" being used to capture the motivational aspect while self-controlled activity when translated yielded the word volition (Parkinson, 2009). Taken together, as a starting point for our understanding and usage of "will" are the notions of choice, purpose, and volition.

Refrainment as Manifestation of the Will

Aside from the circular reasoning employed in defining it in this manner, understanding the "will" as that which is responsible for the manifestation of self-controlled action intimates at the existence of a connection to concepts such as voluntary and volition. While the exercise of volition in the form of performing an observable action may traditionally be thought to reflect one's choice in the matter of execution being voluntary, I contend that it may not since actions may be either voluntary or involuntary. Unlike intelligence (IQ), because volition as a construct

can neither be observed nor transitively validated, it also is not amenable to traditional methods of proof. Thus, such approaches will be fruitless.

a more effective approach in our case would be to rely on one type of action—voluntary or involuntary. Additionally, although based on reflex actions such as the knee-jerk as a paradigm for involuntary, since we know that observed knee-jerk actions can be both voluntary (without stimulus prompt) and involuntary (with stimulus prompt), when stimulus prompting results in the occurrence of knee-jerking we cannot determine whether it was willed. **However, when knee-jerking does not occur as the response to a stimulus prompt we may be sure that it is an involuntary occurrence.** Thus, were we to model an experiment to elicit a demonstration of volition according to the knee-jerk tendon reflex operating under the assumption that some behavior is or can be voluntary; by observing the behavior as response inhibition to a stimulus prompted action, we eliminate the possibility that the observed inhibition occurred involuntarily! **Discerning between voluntary and involuntary action can occur by observing response inhibition to a stimulus prompt.**

It is possible that, in case of the will, there may ultimately be no feasible way to confirm volition can be exercised. Nonetheless, I propose an oversimplified experiment could be similar to the following. Activating the fight or flight response predictably results in physiologic changes associated with readying an individual for action of some sort. if conditions could be arranged (i.e., stimulus prompted) to bring about thee physiologic changes of fight or flight (e.g., fear) in a participant who refrains from taking off (i.e., inaction) despite being showing signs of being afraid, then aside from also exhibiting poor judgment on his or her part perhaps, the failure to act when ready and able would demonstrate a volitional override had occurred.

Using a stimulus prompt to motivate physiological precursors to action that we know occurs reflexively should allow researchers the ability to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary actions. By looking for the inversion of action (i.e., inaction), when response inhibition occurs, they can eliminate anything as potentially voluntary. That is, to say, instead of a stimulus prompted action that we know possibly occurs reflexively, researchers would observe a stimulus prompted inaction occur that is not possible reflexively! refraining from the performance of a physical action may be more representative of one's conscious

decision-making concerning manifested acts of volition given the aforementioned argument.

The Occurrence of Action in the Absence of Reason: Justification of Performance of Action

In light of the discussion of experiments eliciting response inhibition, another point is worth considering: the need for a reason to act. With. Regard to response inhibition we mentioned, if observed, it would be considered voluntary only if our assumption when fight or flight occurs under the appropriate conditions as fear that ought to suffice as a reason to act physiologically. Otherwise, it would be uninformative.

Depending on the perspective, inaction may be viewed as the result of various things from catatonia to the absence of reason. Concerning the absence of reason as it pertains to the philosophy of action, if actions are purpose-driven such that their committal is only to accomplish some personally relevant and meaningful end, then in the absence of such reason the

action should not occur. Nonetheless, such a requirement could be a prerequisite for the performance of an action, but I. would argue that reason by no means can be considered sufficient for an action to occur on the part of the will. **At the very least, reason may be that without which volitional acts cannot occur. If correct that reason is necessary, then an absence of reason should preclude an action's performance—even if that leads to an** absurdity, as in the paradox that follows.

There are many versions of a paradox that is often attributed to philosopher Jean (John) Buridan and referred to as Buridan's Ass. A philosophical parable in some respects, the thought experiment concerns a donkey in need off nourishment who is confronted with a deceptively simple decision to make: choose one of two identical mounds of hay from which to feed equidistant from it –neither of which is associated with any more desirable properties than the other. Despite the apparent straightforward course of action in choosing one from among the two, the unexpected and counterintuitive outcome is that no choice is made and, ultimately, the donkey starves to death!

Starvation of the animal in this case is relevant to our discussion of volition because it may be. interpreted to have resulted from either of two possibilities. Depending on how one views the paradox, the outcome of starvation would either be the result of the animal's choosing or failing to choose. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that making a choice in itself neither assumes or implies the choice was freely made nor does it assume or imply that it was voluntarily made. For instance, the donkey or its loved-ones could in some way have been threatened; though not free, the animal could still have voluntarily made a choice. Moreover, the animal could have been shot with an arrow whose tip was covered in curare inducing paralysis; the donkey's decision then would neither be free nor voluntary in this scenario.

Supposing the donkey was free and acts of its own volition, then in the event the perspective taken on the behavior is that the donkey was merely exercising its volition, then the starvation may be understood as the result of **refrainment** considered voluntary because the choice would have been made under the conscious control of the brain. Additionally, assuming that instincts of self-preservation and survival are paramount for the good of the species (cite), the donkey's starvation as a result of failing to choose potentially implicates, and is consistent with, either the nonexistence of its volition, or the existence of a will that is indecisive at best and impotent or otherwise defective at worst.

So, why might an animal that does possesses a will, which is free not choose under conscious control of the brain (i.e., not voluntarily choose) to exercise volition in order to save its own life in this case if it were possible? Of course, if one considers how hugely flawed a design the absence of a single superlative reason would be to suffice to supersede an animal's livelihood and override its "will to survive" and procreate, it becomes more plausible that despite the outcome the failure to choose was voluntary, which unfortunately implies that the animal simply wanted to die.

Relative Dichotomies and Difference

Insofar as it concerns the donkey's choice, it may be worth mentioning that no matter how identical two, or more, things may be, that there are countably more than one implies that 1) they are somehow different, and that 2) the difference is perceivable. Differences are purposeless if they cannot be perceived; and being aware of a single difference when one exists validates a distinction among two or more things. [can attribute quality of being one of two identical twins. As property]. That solitary difference one perceives the author has termed a relevant dichotomy. A relevant dichotomy is a significant aspect, quality, or factor the sole presence or absence of which can be used to consistently discern between two seemingly identical things; also, an aspect or property that may be used to separate a group into two categories. As an example in which relevant dichotomies play a role is the case of identical twin humans. And although twins may have identical DNA, there are ways to be able to readily distinguish one twin from another consistently.

Generally speaking, differences may exist in one of at least two forms. These forms are considered either qualitative or non-qualitative. For instance, if there exists a set of identical twins A and B, then being first-born and being second-born (i.e., birth order) would be considered a qualitative difference between the two. Conversely, relating to the actual twins individually, being identical twin A and being identical twin B reflect what can be referred to as non-qualitative differences. That is, to say, despite there exists no perceivable qualitatively different characteristics that distinguish one from the other, there are two of them. One form. of reconciliation is to admit non-qualitative differences.

Be they physical or otherwise, there are not many differences of which to speak when one considers genetically identical twins. Nonetheless, whatever differences are found to exist, despite usually being due to differences in genes , controlling for the majority of such potential differences in DNA by considering twins implies the following; either differences that may develop are not based on genes, or they are based on genes y but the relationship between the genes and their phenotypes is not one in which the penetrance is well understood or predictable. It just so happens that There exist some qualitative traits that do differ among genetically identical twins, which present an interesting perspective on quantification of identical entities.

Differences and Biometric Traits

as qualitative traits, some characteristics are identifiable while others are not. For instance, as it concerns identical twins, actual birth order could be argued a qualitative trait. **Nonetheless, though birth order may indeed be a verifiable difference, it is unique in that it is not the sort of thing that is perceptible using the senses, or extensions thereof, either by self or non-self others.**

Unlike birth order, there are other qualitative characteristics that are identifiable in identical twins, which allow for them to be readily discerned from one another. These characteristics, which are called biometric traits, include those found on the face, irides, and fingerprints that are unique to all individuals regardless with and without identical DNA (Debta, Debta, Bhuyan, Swain, Sahu, Siddhartha, 2018). Studies have determined that multimodal use of biometric trait

measurements may be successfully employed in the identification process of one twin from a set (Forrest, 2016).

Biometric trait usage for the identification of one genetically identical twin introduces novel questions. For example, in the actual world as it is for a set of identical twins, although they have the same DNA based on which their traditional traits such as hair and eye color were developed, how can their biometric traits be unique while being considered truly "identical?" Furthermore, if qualitative traits are based on DNA while biometrics is dependent on both genes and environment, then how could biometric traits like fingerprints be guaranteed to associate with the same individual were they to exist in a possible world? That genetically identical individuals do not have identical biometric traits forces us to consider reframing our perspective on what it is to be different and how might one describe differences.

Haecceitism and Supervenience

Characteristics and their interrelations need to be thoroughly considered in order to begin. One of the first concerns ought to be whether there exists a relationship between qualitative and non-qualitative characteristics or are qualitative characteristics independent of non-qualitative ones? If there is a relationship, then what might be the nature of the relationship? While these questions could be approached from various perspectives philosophically, given the circumstances controlling for genetic variation with twins yet needing to substantiate differences, the author has decided to consider the problem according to controversial doctrines haecceitism and supervenience theory.

Socio-cognitive frameworks intricately weave through the concept of "will," demanding a comprehensive lexicogrammatical exploration that considers supervenience and haecceitism(Rao, 2022). Haecceitism considers whether something could be nonqualitatively unique (e.g., quantitatively) without any qualitative differences (Stanford Encyclpedia of Philosophy, 2011). Additionally, supervenience theory claims that a set of properties, P, supervenes on another set, Q, when two things cannot be said to differ with respect to P properties without there being a corresponding difference in the Q properties (McLaughlin & Bennett, 2018).

Though distinct, haecceitism and supervenience concern characteristics or properties and whether or how one may discern between multiples that exist. Haecceitistically, one might wonder whether in a possible world including the actual one, could there exist quantitatively distinct two President Obamas with no qualitative differences between them. Supervenience motivates asking if the property of being complected gradations of brown supervenes on the property of having melanin producing melanocytes, then could two people differ in the extent of their degree of skin pigmentation without there being a corresponding difference in melanin produced by their cells? The relationship characteristic of supervenience is associative or correlative at best, not causal, nor does it attempt to explain how the relation comes about. Both concepts complement one another and can be used to consider different perspectives on the same situation in question.

With these concepts in mind and a basic understanding of biometric traits, we now Consider The following restatement of our question: Do fingerprints and other biometric traits supervene on DNA? If so, then how would the same traits be guaranteed to associate with the same individual or DNA source? It seems as though supervenience does not apply to biometric traits because

there are differences in fingerprints without there being any differences in genetics in the case of identical twins. **Furthermore, whether considering a possible world distinct from the actual, or the possibility of swapping THE birth order of genetic twins in the same world (Cowling,** 2016), in fingerprints failing to supervene on genes given their existence being evidence of at least one qualitative difference between genetic identicals, **I contend things such as biometric traits may in fact be one explanation that reconciles that referred to as non-qualitative differences that constitute the foundation of haecceiticism. In other words, since there is at least one case with fingerprints concerning identical twins, I argue that what were thought to be nonqualitative differences don't actually exist *per se*; whatever property difference there may be that is perceived there exists another on which it supervenes that accounts for that difference.**

Thus, there are two distinct people with the twins because there are personality differences. Given the differences in personality as the set of P properties, the difference in fingerprints as the set of F properties makes the relation between the two properties one of supervenience. That is, there could not be differences in personality without differences in fingerprints in genetic identicals. For that matter, to be clear, if somehow, we could convincingly create an experiment in which genetic twins had the same personality, then this changes nothing; once the participant encounters the first difference in biometric trait, another difference is entailed. This raises an interesting issue consequently. If it is the case that supervenience theory is correctly asserted, then there could never be only one difference between any two or more things!! this is striking me as somewhat unusual intuitively.

What is it about requiring there be at least two differences that justifies the existence of difference? Immediately, I figured it out and it makes sense: it is not possible to have 1 difference between 2 things! For two things to exist there must be at least two differences! The key is that the supervenience as understood currently requires two nonempty sets of properties set of properties. I contend that instead, supervenience only requires one set of properties but that there must be at least 2 members of that single set. This would mean that in this case supervenience would need to be a binary relation with conditions of reflexivity to access itself.

Assuming genetic identicals could have the same personality, even though that leaves biometric traits as the single source of properties to differentiate the twins, as a set of traits, there exist at least two responsible for the supervenience relation to be established.

Biometric trait 1 differences mean biometric trait 2 has differences on which trait 1 supervenes. My hypothesis may help to explain pluralism or how we can have multiple anything. Whether from one extreme of taxonomic contrasts point by point where everything differs between two things all the way to genetically identical twins on the other, one thing becomes evident: some underlying difference is the singular thing that is shared thereby allowing for multiplicity whether or not the properties on which supervene those perceived as different.

That is, to say, if we suppose twins A and B could swap birth order leaving all else qualitatively intact—assuming we include fingerprints, then there would still be different biometric traits for each twin because they do not supervene on genetics! So, either just the order inverts and essence of B assumed the vessel of A and vice versa giving each twin the other's prints (i.e., a difference), or since no supervenience applies, along with essences swapping order being other

than actual, each twin has new fingerprints that distinguish them (i.e., a difference). Regardless, if most qualitative characteristics depend on genetics but fingerprints differ in the case of identical twins, then it appears as though there is at least this one counterexample to possible worlds interpretation of haecceiticism. That is, an alternate universes or possible world can comprise twin humans with unchanged qualitative characteristics based on identical human DNA yet there will be unique biometric traits for each one. Therefore, based on different biometric traits with each instantiation of booth genetically identical humans, even if we were to grant their existence, there appears to be no way for nonqualitative differences to exist without the concomitant existence of at least biometric trait differences.

Relevant Dichotomies and the Fate of the Ass

Concerning the Paradox of Buridan's ass, that there were two identical mounds entails the existence of at least one relevant dichotomy. It is such a relevant dichotomy, which would facilitate distinguishing the two mounds from one another. Given the option to nourish itself, however, why might the donkey that possesses a will, which is truly free choose under conscious control of the brain (i.e., voluntarily) not to exercise volition in order to save its own life in this case if it were possible? Suicide could be one example of a situation in which, despite the assumed existence of a free and potent will, the donkey might wish to let itself perish. Thus, the donkey's inaction could be argued voluntary if interpreted as it essentially choosing not to choose. In theory, choosing not to choose could be interpreted as a conscious decision that one makes in exercising his or her volition. Although, there would be difficulty validating whether volition could be exercised iteratively and negatively in this fashion.

The author contends that there is something inherently contradictory about making an effort to exercise volition in the absence of a desire to live, or lack of desire to do anything for that matter. In some sense, such absence of desire feels as though it should also extinguish one's will, period. that is, to say, assuming the donkey was suicidal, why bother making an effort to do anything, specifically, doing something that prolongs the suffering? especially considering that doing nothing would guarantee to result in the same outcome, it makes more sense to do nothing without having exercised one's volition than too. Have done so voluntarily. Exercising volition to choose not to choose equates with failing to exercise volition to choose.

Here's the problem: there is choosing and there is not choosing. Then, there is choosing to choose, not choosing to choose, choosing not to choose, and not choosing to not choose.

Iterated Choice

Instead of exercising volition by choosing, the donkey's failure to exercise volition would be consistent with lacking the desire to survive since the suicidal donkey would eventually die. Furthermore, I argue that failing to exercise volition by making a choice of any kind. may be indicative of lacking the ability to do so—no volition of which to speak remains. Borrowing from the logic of (common) knowledge on which to base A logic of choice, choosing that not something implies that it is not the case that one chooses to choose that thing. Thus, although it is possible to voluntarily inhibit oneself, it is not possible to phrase as choosing Not to choose because its indistinguishable from failing to do So.

Assuming teleologically that actions are purposeful, whether inaction results from the absence of a single best reason, or the presence of two or more equivalently good ones (e.g., one cannot decide), what is observed may not be conscious deferment or an exercise of volition; it may in fact be a state resulting from an inability to make a choice. Furthermore,

I argue that the difficulty would be in getting one to act from the resultant state in either circumstance; if ultimately one does act by choosing, then it would only be after he or she has decided something would serve as a reason or deceived the will into choosing among identical options to direct and commit actions.

As a counterexample to the position of purposeful action as it pertains to the will, in the event there exists two or more equally justifiable choices of action, if truly equal with no significant benefit existing in the performance of one over the other, then if one does perform either of the actions, then reason alone could not rationally explain its committal. While admittedly possible for there to be a reason to perform one act over another that lies beyond one's ability to know, to claim that such a reason was the impetus for the will to act does nothing to support freedom to choose to perform the act; claiming one's consciously committing an act for a legitimate reason by a will of someone who does not know of such reason would be tantamount to the admission of acting out of a state of ignorance, which renders one incapable of having freely chosen to consciously commit the act in question.

Thus, either in the absence of any real known purpose to commit by the will, or the presence

of a choice between two or more actions each known by the will to have reasons to be committed that are no more forceful than the other, there ought to be no performance of action. Moreover, to accept the alternative of not requiring a purpose for consciously committed actions to be performed —regardless of whether a purpose fails to exist or does exist as unknown to the potential performer— would be less than desirable because making such a concession would be akin to admitting that actions are nothing more than random or haphazard movements that demonstrate human behavior as pointless.

Reflexive Actions and Volition

While neither pointless nor under conscious control of the brain, physiological reflexes may provide insight into the nature of. volitional action. These actions are not truly voluntary; yet humans do perform them. As such, reflexes are an interesting case to consider with regard to volitional performance

Reflexive actions —i.e., jaw joint reflex or the patellar tendon reflex— are instances in which actions are performed as a result of satisfying a particular purpose that we understand regardless of our desire to commit them. Reflexes differ and do not serve as counterarguments demonstrating that the will (i.e., person) need not be aware of an actions purpose to be committed. Firstly, in the case of reflexes their performance results in the purpose becoming known ex post facto such that if two distinct reflexes are performed, they cannot be found to serve the same single purpose. Secondly, the performance of either of two non-reflexive actions cannot be based on one and the same reason; there may exist more than one way to accomplish a goal in retrospect but there can only be found one purpose in performing a particular action. Therefore, in order to reconcile multiple ways in which to act to achieve a sole outcome with one

action's performance serving two or more purposes, it must be conceded that perspective may account for apparent differences on a different level.

Nevertheless, I argue that their existence legitimately challenges any notion of freedom of the will because reflexes exist for a multitude of involuntary actions that overlap with those we claim to perform of our choosing.

For instance, in addition to the reflexes that exist for the jaw joint and the patellar reflex, reflexes also exist for chewing, swallowing, blinking, the scratch reflex of the cornea. m but also stepping, standing, and mating (Encyclopedia Britanica, 2016).

Additionally, each reflex arc requires unique stimuli to be elicited (Britanica, 2016). Reflex arcs are the result of an integrated nervous system, which includes neuroplasticity to allow for innate reflex responses to be conditioned and adapt to particular yet unrelated circumstances.

The epitome of such classically conditioned response modification was the demonstrated in the research performed by Pavlov (Horeslly & Gantt, 2019). That reflex action performance may be conditioned allows me to infer that 1) actions are modifiable according to stimulus association and 2) a stimulus is required for their performance. Nothing implies that actions can be initiated or even sustained by the will. Therefore, how can one discount the possibility that all actions performed are the result of an innate reflex arc, classical conditioning with unrelated stimuli, or a cascade effect involving denumerably sequential responses from the former to the latter? Cascade I argue that though stimuli may be exchanged for, or replaced by, one another, unless stimuli requirements are obviated or extinguished altogether, then there can be no determination made as to the role anything beyond reflex arc activation plays in acting.

Actions versus Behaviors; Time Perception

Time may not exist as an inherent property of the experiences themselves—as though ten milliseconds were intrinsic to the experience of losing interest in an object of anyone's attention; however, time is considered a feature of living human experience (Bardon & Dyke, 2013) that serves as a reference for the occurrence of phenomena. Furthermore, time is interpretive and often inferred to try to reconcile the experiences in the living. Along with the specious present, experiencing succession and that of simultaneity may be analogous to the sensory effects Related to sound like Frequency domain masking and Temporal masking or even beats.

Choice is not an illusion, it is real; behaviors are voluntary, actions are not. The distinguishing factor between behavior and action is that action is the performance of the act in question whereas behavior may be understood as the manner in which one carries out the action regardless of whether or not it is completed.

Voluntary is not in the sense that one chooses the action being done from nothing; voluntary in that one's choice is in which action one ought to do among several actions-options available for doing. In the absence of a clear advantage of one action-option over others available based on the calculation of risk-benefit ratios of outcomes from equations comprising one's genetics and circumstances, inaction may result. Furthermore, the likelihood of inaction is directly proportional to the number of equivalent risk-benefit ratios there are–meaning subjectively good

or bad to person having them not as judged by others – so subjective consistency of thoughts-feelings is a theory of author.

As a skeptic, the author holds that if the will exists, then it is neither free nor unfree because it is not the kind of thing about which either can be claimed. When Aristotle refers to self-controlled activity as being voluntary and uncontrolled activity the result of being compelled (Parkinson, 2008), it is understood that one desires based on their knowledge yet without compulsion substantiates the nature of such activity being voluntary. Nonetheless,

I disagree with "phronesis" or practical wisdom. Reason cannot be a co-producer of desires the way in which Aristotle claims. I contend that reflection and introspection through reasoning may be considered beneficial but because something is deduced or concluded logically is insufficient to create a desire for it. For some philosophers such as Aquinas, the will was viewed as rational desires that only result from application of reason, not senses (Parkinson, 2008); thus, animals according to this position differ from humans because their desire is fixed by sense alone. Not only is desire not fixed by sense alone in animals including humans, but desire can be recognized in oneself. Furthermore, desire is not created by a process of rationalization nor sensation.

It should be emphasized what is meant by desire because some may think that the application of reason can create desire. Let us suppose that after a life spent indulging in one's poor eating habits and much contemplation, one has begun to desire a healthy lifestyle. Would this not be a case of using reason to spark desire**? The reason that this example would not be considered a case is because the behavior in which one engages as a result of reason does not directly satisfy their newfound desire; it is a means to achieving some end and not an end in itself.** True desires one possesses may be discovered to be purposeful consequentially through association, but they may not be arrived at intellectually from the application of reason. For instance, desire is not created for sweets because one tastes (senses) them; upon tasting sweets one realizes they are something desired —they are not made to desire them. The way to determine this would be the following: if it were true, then sense perception would necessarily result in fixed desires for the same things based solely on exposure, which is not the case.

This finding is relevant to the issue of free will because desire and choice are associated such that by their very nature desires if known entice one into the choice of indulgence. Additionally, because nobody would voluntarily miss an opportunity to satisfy a desire, and since either desire can be satisfied or not, we know the following: willing oneself to miss a chance to satisfy would be involuntary if something is truly desired, yet given the enticement satisfying the same desire could be considered involuntary as well.

Regardless the outcome, if any way exists to salvage the possibility of freedom of the will to choose it rests with the uncovering the intention of the will.

Intention of the Will

Aquinas' position is that intention is action directed toward an end of which animals are not supposedly capable (cite). Such a position appears to view intention as action itself, which effectively materializes the immaterial. Because **Intention cannot be directly or immediately perceived, but action may be, I argue that** action may only allow one to infer about intention. To be equated with action would be an overextension in the author's opinion.

If one claims or interprets the color blue as yellow, then what can be said of their relation? Either one is a type of the other, is the other, or both share something in common that binds them. So, either blue is a type of yellow, blue is yellow, or blue and yellow share in being something. The conclusion is that blue is a color and so is yellow,

Although not the same and one isn't a type of another, if yellow is a color, and colors are perceptible, then blue is perceptible. Can blue be a color and not have been a perceptible property while yellow is a color that does? No. If the relation is that between something and its superordinate, or that of identity, then there at least exists one property which is shared among the two.

I argue that if the sight of the milkman triggers a dog's attack, then the dog must have had an intention, viz., to attack the mailman; for in the absence of intention, were an attack to still occur upon seeing the milkman, either it could never trigger or always would have to trigger an attack making it an automatic reflex. Since it sometimes occurs and others does not occur, it is contingent. Contingence is the result of possible yes and possible no to condition. The condition is intent. There is the enthymeme of the dog having no intention already insinuated, which is a conclusion trying to be proven. Such argumentation is circular in its application of logic by its assumption.

Thomas Hobbes' considers what he called bodily movement **appetites versus aversions**. For Hobbes, no will exists; there is just a duel of appetites and aversions. Deliberation occurs between things drawn toward and pushed away from, and the desire or aversion last gaining the upper hand before moving is known as appetite, with the last appetite causing us to move. Thus, for Hobbes, this **last appetite is the will**, which removes the power of the will as a mind's commanding.

John Locke attacks faculty psychology claiming that the names of understanding and will allowed people to misinterpret faculties for entities capable of performing acts on behalf of the body and mind. He says the will is a power. But what is the will if not a faculty? It is,

Locke argues, a power; namely simple, original and unanalyzable idea arising through reflection on change. '[W]hatever change is observed,' he writes, 'the mind must collect a power somewhere, able to make that change, as well as a possibility in the thing itself to receive it.'

Is the Will Active of Passive? ARGUMENT AGAINST COMPATIBILISM

David Hume believed volitions are felt (like an emotion). "Reason is and ought only to be a slave to the passions." Synonymous with emotion is passion (Wordweb, 2019); thus, one becomes emotional over things about which he or she is passionate. Reason is not practical, but is useful in determining objects of desire, and means to satisfy them. Desires are synonymous with passions (Wordweb, 2019). But reason is inactive. Also, Hume states that liberty not opposed to necessity; liberty opposed to constraint (citation).

AJ Ayer claimed that because one's actions may be causally determined it does not mean or necessarily follow that one is not free. Such a position is referred to as compatibilism, which holds that freedom and determinism are consistent with one another.

Nonetheless, I do not agree in that if actions are causally determined, and actions are doing something, then one's doing something is causally determined as well. Additionally, if liberty is the power of doing or not doing something according to the determination of the will (Hume), then because when doing something an action is causally determined by the will, there can be no liberty directly without the act of determination by the will being causally determined itself by something else**. Now, then, there must be a (causal) determinant of determining done by the will, which leads into an infinite regress.**

The significance of demonstrating how such a position with regard to liberty swiftly leads into an infinite regress is that a causally determined action given action is considered doing something renders compatibilism incompatible. Under the assumption that liberty is the will determining to do or not to do something, how does one reconcile it exercising power in freely determining anything? For example, if the will determined something be done, then although the action done would be causally determined the act of the will determining being determined itself, ad infinitum, effectively removes any claim to have had power in choosing whether to do or not do initially.

So, let us assume that causal determination exists for one x such that if x is an action, then actions are the effects of some particular causal determinant (e.g., the will). From this, can it be inferred that for all x where x is an action, causality exists to explain the occurrence of the action? Or, conversely, could it be the case that one or multiple actions may be sometimes causally determined while at other times these very same actions need not be?

There can hardly be a definitive answer from an outsider's perspective regarding this topic. What I contend is not that it is impossible for actions to be performed that need not be causally determined because, in fact, it could be possible. **My contention is** that, if it were the case that causal determinants were not necessary, then due to the existence of any action that is possibly causally determined there could **be no reliable and valid way to** discern between the different classes of act performed.

The Indiscernibility of Blinking from Winking: Experiment in Identifying Acts of Volition

Supposing that there exists at least one action (i.e., eyelid closure and opening) that may or may not be the result of causal determination (i.e., volition), how might we attempt to determine whether the two classes of act (willed versus involuntary/causally determined and non-causally determined) are discernible from one another? By experiment, of course! Let us take one particular action—eye closure—and under experimental conditions attempt to determine whether one can distinguish between an involuntary blink and a willed wink with significantly greater accuracy than chance alone.

Our assumption is that a wink may be "willed" so-to-speak whereas a blink may not be. Since wink or blink are the only two options for each trial, the probability distribution ought to resemble that of a fair coin-toss. Thus, p(w)ink = 0.5; p(blink) = 0.5. The experiment would involve teaching participants how to observe volunteers who will be evaluated for each eye-closure event. Once the experiment begins the observers would be instructed to watch two randomly selected volunteers from a pool of calibrated candidates, person A and person B, on a monitor side-by-side split screen with zoom to their faces and asked to choose either person A or B and indicate voluntary or involuntary for each occurrence of eye-closure for that volunteer

only. One volunteer person for each round would be randomly chosen to wear an undetectable earwig through which a single-word command "blink" was randomly given any number of reasonable times interspersed among the person's own involuntary blinks. The other volunteer would have no such commands and serve as the sham eye-closure.

Importantly, the only eye-closures that matter would be the willed ones because of the uncertainty associated with the influence that awareness and participation may have on what blinks were truly involuntary. With additional modifications to the design that I have not included, the experiment could yield decent results. The main point is that although some eye-closures are willed winks and others are involuntary blinks occurring from a first-person perspective, from a third-person onlooker's viewpoint, it is possible that the two types are indiscernible to an observer. If so, then despite one's subjective knowledge of caused or willed winks, there may exist no way to distinguish or determine in others. Such conditions are referred to as incomplete objective knowledge states, which would coexist intermingled among complete knowledge states that are subjective. As a surrogate for the generically willed action, this demonstrates how it may be possible for the will to exist and exert influence on actions yet not be something verifiable or about which we could directly know outside of ourselves.

Consider the blink, a physiological activity typically outside conscious control, occurring synchronously in both eyes, yet humans can consciously extend the period between blinks (Kowalczyk and Sawicki, 2018). In contrast, a wink is a conscious, intentional closing of the eyelid, often performed asymmetrically (Kowalczyk and Sawicki, 2018). Further complicating matters, speakers unconsciously adjust their behavior based on subtle variations in listener's blinks, suggesting that blinks serve as communicative signals in social interactions (Hömke, Holler and Levinson, 2018). Therefore, even if an action is consciously willed, it must interact and exist within the realm of physiology and the social structure of behavior, each of which influences and in turn is influenced by the will and action.

Therefore, one must consider how an intentional movement such as a wink can be distinguished from a nonintentional movement such as a blink, especially in individuals who cannot communicate their intentions. The complex muscle system controlling the eyelids further complicates this distinction, because although it may be consciously willed to perform the action of winking, its reliance on the body's physiology means that it is subjected to the conditions under which that system operates (Kowalczyk and Sawicki, 2018; Derchi et al., 2023). The measurement of blinks can be achieved through video analysis, identifying blink starts and ends based on eyelid and pupil movements (Jiang et al., 2012).

So, again, supposing that there exists at least one action (i.e., eyelid closure and opening) that may or may not be the result of causal determination/willing, how might we attempt to exploit this experimentally to determine whether the two classes of an act (i.e., causally determined/voluntary and non-causally determined/involuntary) are discernible from one another? One option is to take one particular action and a hypothetical scenario in which the action was the result of the causal determination in one case, yet in another, it is not causally determined. Our research question might be: how does one distinguish between a blink and a wink?

While it is indeed fascinating that blinks might be related to cognitive states (Bevan and Fraser, 2016), the relationship between blinking and winking is hypothesized to be one in which,

according to the author, the wink may be "willed" so-to-speak whereas the blink may not be. In other words, I used the distinction between a blink and a wink, where a blink is typically involuntary and a wink is intentional (Kowalczyk and Sawicki, 2018). **A blink is a physiological activity that is typically involuntary, involving the synchronous movement of both eyelids, while a wink is a conscious, intentional closing of one eyelid** (Kowalczyk and Sawicki, 2018). Superficially, to the observer uninitiated, were a hypothetical experiment conducted in which we taught subjects how then asked them to watch person A and person B on a monitor side-by-side split screen and mark down the number of times each participant blinked without informing subjects that one person each round would be randomly assigned and wear an undetectable earwig through which a single-word command "blink" was randomly given and interspersed with the person's own involuntary blinking based on the blink-rate statistics data previously known. The research question would be whether for each observed blink could observers distinguish between blinks that were willed and those that were not with significantly different accuracy than 50% due to chance at the 0.05 alpha level.

The research hypothesis is No, there is no way to more accurately identify willed blinks than those blinks that occurred spontaneously. Thus, either all acts are causally induced or there exist some that can be willed and some of the same sort that cannot be willed (involuntary). Anyone may attempt to test with their own blink whether all occur without one's will by willing first, then not blinking themselves for as long as possible. What one will find is that once will resist blinking fails, the first thing occurring without one's will in this experiment is ... blinking. Don't just correlate verbal indicator with the singular occurrence of blinking; indicate how many blinks, or how long of a blink, or a pattern of blinks, etc., you will perform to eliminate chance coincidence. It is easily falsified; not all blinks are involuntary because one can predict with 100% accuracy and manipulate number, length of each blink, pattern, eye, etc.

Though established some willed and some not willed blinks occur from a first-person perspective, from a third-person onlooker's viewpoint, is it possible that willed and unwilled blinks can be indiscernible to an observer? If so, then although subjective knowledge of caused or willed winks exists, for all one knows no way to distinguish in others what is causally determined or willed in any possible world. This situation establishes the conditions for what is referred to as incomplete objective knowledge states to exist intermingled among those that are complete knowledge states, which are subjective. As a surrogate for the generically willed action, this demonstrates how it may be possible for the will to exist and exert influence as earlier discussed yet not be something about which we could know.

A person's blink duration can influence a speaker's behavior, implying that blinks convey communicative signals (Hömke, Holler and Levinson, 2018). Further research could explore whether speakers adjust their behavior differently to intentionally prolonged blinks (winks) compared to regular blinks, potentially revealing subtle distinctions in how these actions are perceived (Hömke, Holler and Levinson, 2018). The human capacity to consciously control blinking and winking, highlights the intricate interplay between voluntary and involuntary actions (Kowalczyk and Sawicki, 2018). Differentiating between intentional and non-intentional movements, particularly in the context of blinking, poses a challenge that can be addressed through EEG and kinematic markers (Derchi et al., 2023). The potential to communicate meaning through blinking, especially for individuals with limited communication abilities, underscores the significance of understanding the nuances of this seemingly simple action (Derchi et al., 2023).

Conclusion

This research has explored the complex relationship between the will, causal determination, and objective knowledge, using the seemingly simple act of blinking as a focal point. Our investigation into the indiscernibility of willed versus unwilled blinks leads us to question the extent to which we can reliably distinguish between actions that are freely chosen and those that are causally determined.

The central hypothesis – that willed blinks cannot be identified with an accuracy greater than chance – challenges the assumption that all actions are easily categorized as either freely willed or causally determined. If willed and unwilled blinks are indeed indiscernible to an observer, this has significant implications for our understanding of the will. The dependence of one thing on another does not necessarily imply a causal relationship. The subjective experience of choice may not always align with objective reality. The very feeling of making free choices could potentially be a cognitive illusion.

This research touches upon the philosophical debate between compatibilism, determinism, and libertarianism. If causal determination of our will were true, it would imply that our experience of making choices is ultimately illusory, which is incompatible with compatibilism. Our findings suggest limits to objective knowledge, particularly regarding internal states and intentions. Even if the will exists and exerts influence, it may not be something about which we can have definitive objective knowledge.

These insights have broader implications for our understanding of human agency and responsibility. By questioning the ability to distinguish between causally determined and willed actions, we raise questions about how we attribute agency and hold individuals accountable for their actions.

Future research could explore the neurobiological correlates of willed and unwilled actions, seeking to identify potential neural markers that distinguish between the two. However, even with advances in neuroscience, the fundamental question of whether we can truly know the difference between a willed action and a causally determined one remains a significant challenge. Perhaps exploring scenarios where eye gestures, such as winks, are used as control tools could offer additional insights (Kowalczyk and Sawicki, 2018). Ultimately, this research encourages a more nuanced perspective on the will, acknowledging its complexity and the limitations of our ability to fully understand its nature through objective observation alone.

Summary

In simple terms, this research paper asks whether we can tell the difference between a real, involuntary blink and a fake, intentional blink (a wink, essentially). The study suggests that, from an outside observer's perspective, it might be impossible to reliably tell the difference.

The idea is tested with a hypothetical experiment involving subjects watching people blink on a screen, with one person blinking normally and the other blinking on command via an earpiece. The paper hypothesizes that observers won't be able to tell the difference between the two types of blinks with any accuracy (Kowalczyk and Sawicki, 2018).

The paper argues that if we can't distinguish between willed and unwilled blinks, it raises questions about our understanding of free will and how much we can truly know about others' intentions. It touches upon the idea that even our feeling of making free choices might be an illusion. While blinking might seem like a small thing, this research uses it to explore bigger philosophical questions about choice, causality, and knowledge.

Research indicates that spontaneous blinking may reveal one's cognitive state and that speakers may adjust their behavior based on a listener's blinking (Bevan and Fraser, 2016; Hömke, Holler and Levinson, 2018). It appears that spontaneous blinking happens about 12 times per minute and is influenced by things like age, gender, personality, and how alert someone is (Callara et al., 2023).

Research Problem

The research problem is the difficulty in discerning between causally determined actions and actions that are willed, specifically when considering actions like blinking and winking. The paper explores whether an observer can reliably distinguish between a willed blink and an involuntary blink (Kowalczyk and Sawicki, 2018). It questions if, even with subjective knowledge of willed actions, there's an objective way to differentiate them. The core of the problem lies in the potential indiscernibility between these types of actions, leading to questions about the nature of the will and its influence, even if it cannot be objectively known. The complexities inherent in studying the will arise from its ambiguous categorical status, uncertain structural elements, and the lack of comprehensive psycho-diagnostic techniques (Шелехов et al., 2020). The human experience of exerting one's will is central to decision-making and action, yet the nature of this experience remains elusive and controversial (Kalis, 2019).

Research Purpose

The research purpose of this paper is to investigate the problem of distinguishing between causally determined and willed actions, using blinking and winking as examples. It questions whether we can reliably tell the difference between a voluntary wink and an involuntary blink from an outsider's perspective (Kowalczyk and Sawicki, 2018). The study aims to explore the implications of this potential indiscernibility for our understanding of the will and its influence, even if it cannot be objectively determined.

The paper proposes a hypothetical experiment to test whether observers can distinguish between willed and unwilled blinks (Kowalczyk and Sawicki, 2018). If willed and unwilled blinks are indeed indiscernible to an observer, it would suggest that subjective knowledge of willed actions can exist alongside incomplete objective knowledge. The research also explores whether the dependence of one thing on another necessitates a causal relationship. The paper contributes to the philosophical debate on free will and determinism by examining whether the will can exist and exert influence even if it is not something about which we can have objective knowledge.

Research Question

Can one reliably discern, from an outsider's perspective, actions that are willed from actions that are causally determined, specifically when examining acts such as blinking and winking? The research question is: "How does one distinguish between a blink and a wink?"

Expanding on that, the research question explores whether an observer can reliably distinguish between blinks that are willed and those that are involuntary (Kowalczyk and Sawicki, 2018). The core of the question lies in whether willed and unwilled blinks can be indiscernible from a third-person perspective, and what this implies about our knowledge of the will.

Research Hypothesis

The hypothesis of this paper is that it is not possible to reliably distinguish between causally determined actions and willed actions, particularly when considering actions such as blinking and winking, from an outsider's perspective. The research hypothesis, then, specifically claims: "No, there is no way to more accurately identify willed blinks than those blinks that occurred spontaneously."

In other words, the hypothesis posits that observers cannot distinguish between willed blinks and involuntary blinks with an accuracy significantly better than 50% (chance level) (Kowalczyk and Sawicki, 2018). This is because it is anticipated that the mechanisms for a blink or wink are similar enough that observers are unable to differentiate their source as willed or unwilled (Hömke, Holler and Levinson, 2018). The hypothesis suggests that even if subjective knowledge of willed actions exists for the individual performing the action, there may be no way to objectively distinguish them from the outside.

Research Significance

The study of willed actions and their differentiation from causally determined actions holds significant implications across various fields, ranging from philosophy and psychology to law and neuroscience.

The research significance of this paper lies in its exploration of the limits of objective knowledge and the nature of the will. By investigating the indiscernibility of willed and unwilled actions, it challenges the assumption that all actions can be definitively categorized as either causally determined or freely willed.

Here's why that's significant:

- **Challenges Compatibilism:** The paper engages with the philosophical problem of free will and determinism, particularly questioning compatibilism -- the idea that free will and determinism are compatible. Demonstrating how a position with regard to liberty leads into an infinite regress is that a causally determined action renders compatibilism incompatible.
- **Highlights Limits of Objective Knowledge:** The research suggests that even if the will exists and exerts influence, it may not be something about which we can have objective knowledge. If willed and unwilled blinks are indiscernible from a third-person perspective, it points to the limits of objective observation in understanding internal states and intentions.
- **Implications for Understanding Agency:** By questioning the ability to distinguish between causally determined and willed actions, the paper raises broader questions about our understanding of human agency and responsibility.
- **Methodological Innovation:** The hypothetical experiment involving the manipulation of blinks could potentially offer a novel approach to studying intention and action.

While blinking and winking may seem like simple actions, they serve as a lens through which to examine fundamental questions about causality, free will, and the nature of knowledge. Distinguishing between willed and nonintentional actions is achievable by focusing on blinking, which is a frequent spontaneous action but can also be done intentionally (Derchi et al., 2023).

The illusion of conscious will has gained traction, leading some to believe that free will is a mere fabrication, a concept influenced by experiments like those conducted by Libet (Slors, 2019).

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